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Protection from Crime: What is on Offer for 
Africans? 
 
At independence many in Africa anticipated a national state police force that would 
provide a universal, effective and just protection from crime and disorder, but after 40 
years of independence it has become apparent that African governments are not 
willing or able to provide the level of service they had promised. The explanation is 
partly financial, but it is also true that weak states often choose to privilege “regime 
stability and narrow sectional interests over public safety considerations” or at times 
are simply guilty of “malevolent indifference” (Goldsmith, 2003: 4,7; Hills, 2000). 
As regards offering protection for citizens, state police are widely perceived as 
indifferent, inept, inefficient and corrupt (Adu-Mireku, 2002; Chukwuma, 2000; 
Shaw, 2002). Worse, there are many occasions when the police, pursuing their own or 
regime interests, commit extra-judicial killings, beat detainees, use excessive force, 
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and act in collusion with criminals (see annual 
reports of US Department of State, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). 
Given their regime-determined agenda, it is little surprising that police who commit 
such abuses are rarely investigated or punished.  
 
For those living in rural areas and townships, it is not just that the state police are 
ineffective, predatory and potentially violent; they are absent (Pelsner et al., 2000). 
The Nigerian political scientist, Peter Ekeh, sums up the situation facing many in 
Africa today: 
 
Nigerian governments have virtually told Nigerians to fend for their own protection. My 
hometown of Okpara with its environs has a population that is more than 20,000 people in 
Delta State. It has no police station. Indeed, there is no presence of government in the daily 
lives of its people. That is, the Nigerian state and its governmental agencies are absent
 
 from 
their daily lives. Crimes will be committed in any community and are being committed in my 
hometown. How are they resolved?; clearly without the help of any governmental agencies 
(Ekeh, 2002).  
But policing is not just an activity of the state police. Policing, as understood in this 
article, is any organised activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal 
order, security and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of 
breaches, and punishment. It is in fact a mechanism of governance. As such it can be 
authorised and provided by non-state groups as well as the state. Some see the failure 
of the state police as the cause of the rapid emergence of non-state or self-policing in 
Africa. The rise in non-state policing, however, is not a totally new phenomenon 
arising from economic liberalisation and the privatisation of state functions. Years of 
autocratic predation that had little concern for legality or socialist leadership that 
sought a legal system that served the interests of the state, provoked alienation from 
the official law and the development of informal legal orders that by-passed and 
neutralised it.  Going back even further, alternative security arrangements predate 
state (and colonial) policing and were never totally displaced by it (Waller, 1999; 
Turner, 1955; Killingray, 1986; Ahire, 1991). The two, of course, are not policing the 
same order (Buur, 2003a). The state police have always been agents of an authority 
that for many is following alien values concerning how crime is defined (e.g. does it 
include witchcraft, adultery, teenage pregnancy, disrespect to parents, unwarranted 
evictions) and how it is punished (e.g. does it undertake corporal punishment). Thus 
even if the state police were effective in their role, there would still continue forms of 
policing of alternative orders (Nina and Scharf, 2001). But if state policing failures 
have not caused non-state policing, their failures have certainly reinvigorated it. It has 
also ensured that it has taken new forms, since part of the independent state project 
ensured that local chiefs had their powers to authorise policing too weakened to be 
able to fill the security vacuum.  
 
Also driving self-policing is the real or perceived increase in crime following the 
political and economic liberalisation of the last 15 years. There is a widespread fear of 
crime and disorder, especially among those with the least resources to defend 
themselves, such as females and the poor (Alvazzi del Frate, 1998). Africa is currently 
viewed as the most violent continent on the basis of crime victimization rates (Zvekic, 
1995, 1998). According to one survey of Uganda, South Africa and Tanzania, three 
out of every four in the cities had been victims of violence 1991-95. South African 
Police figures for 2002-3 also show high levels of crime. Murder rates are 47.4 per 
100,000 of the population, whilst rape is at 115.3 per 100,000. (Business Day, 
Johannesburg, September 23, 2003). Despite some drops in crime rates over recent 
years, the fear of crime in South Africa is widespread. In a survey of victims of crime 
in a twelve month period, it was found that 16 per cent of the black population, 39 per 
cent of the white, 18 per cent of the coloured and 32 per cent of the Indian were 
affected. (Humphries, 2000: 4). Figures for Accra in Ghana show similar large 
increases in the last decade. Total crimes recorded by the 4 police divisions of the city 
jumped from 26,946 in 1990 to 44,567 in 1996. Taking selected offences, murder rose 
from 20 per year to 51; assault from 9,551 to 17,905, theft from 7,659 to 12,911 
(Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2003: 17). In a nation-wide survey in Nigeria, conducted in 
October 2000, the public was asked, “has crime abated in your area within the past 
one year?”, 65.8 per cent said crime in their areas had worsened. Of the 33.4 per cent 
who said the rate of crime had dropped in their areas, most attributed this decline to 
the emergence of vigilante and anti-crime groups (Post Express, Lagos, October 16, 
2000). Whether rising crime is merely the product of more extensive reporting and 
recording of crime or whether there is a genuine rise associated with the weakening of 
traditional forms of social control, the fact is that it has provoked anxiety over crime 
protection.  
 
Together, the perceptions of failing state police and rising crime have created a 
situation today where a plethora of non-state policing groups have emerged across the 
continent. Their variety is bewildering. Some adhere to the law and have police 
support, some are lawless and violent in their assault on crime; some are spontaneous, 
short lived or evolving, some are more permanent commercial enterprises. They are 
authorised by an array of groups besides governments. These include economic 
interests (legal and illegal), residential communities, cultural communities, and 
individuals. Similarly, there is considerable variety amongst those who provide 
policing. Commercial companies, non-state authorisers of policing, individuals, as 
well as governments are involved.  It is this variety and complexity that this article 
explores. It begins with an examination of the paradigms that have been proposed to 
capture this fragmentation of policing, before introducing a typology of the various 
categories of policing groups that have arisen and their key features. The article 





Policing has been observed to be fragmenting not just in Africa but worldwide and 
there have been various attempts to capture it conceptually. The first may be called 
neo-feudalism. When private policing was “rediscovered” in the West (Shearing and 
Stenning, 1981, 1983; Spitzer and Scull, 1977; South, 1988; Johnston, 1992), private 
and public policing were sharply divided, with the former being primarily thought of 
as commercial security. After an initial interest in security guards, research on private 
policing began to note gated residential communities, mass retail outlets, and 
sporting/leisure complexes that suggested “fortified fragments” where a privately 
defined order was administered by private security (Shearing and Kempa, 2000). The 
parallel was drawn with feudal society and that of mediaeval city-states, since the 
fortified enclaves of privilege deployed a system of exclusionary justice. The neo-
feudal paradigm suggests a clear-cut separation between private and public orders of 
policing. However, both public and private policing have important features in 
common. They are both forces of coercion engaged to preserve internal communal 
order and they draw on similar control and investigative techniques. It is, then, 
increasingly hard to separate them analytically. It does not, therefore, fully fit the 
African security world of overlapping and co-operative patterns of security and is 
unduly focussed on the commercial sector of non-state policing.  
 
Bayley and Shearing (2001) conceptualise the complexity more effectively when they 
speak of multilateral policing. They draw attention to the fact not only that private 
policing consists of the informal as well as the formal (commercial), but that there are 
two distinct layers of diversity, namely auspices and providers of policing. This 
division of labour, they argue, is more significant than the traditional distinction 
between “public” and “private” policing, since the roles of state and non-state 
policing often overlap. Their review of policing worldwide suggests that policing is 
authorised by a variety of sponsors: economic interests (both formal and informal, 
legal and illegal), residential communities, cultural communities, individuals and 
governments. Policing provision is equally diverse in their view. It includes 
commercial companies, non-state authorisers of policing, individuals, and 
governments. Thus on the one hand, they note that a variety of nongovernmental 
groups have assumed responsibility for their own protection, whilst on the other hand 
a variety of nongovernmental agencies have undertaken to provide security services. 
Bayley and Shearing are to be welcomed for drawing attention to the (re)entry of 
citizens into policing functions, whether with or without the state police’s blessing. As 
Johnston notes:  
 
Citizens, rather than being the passive consumers of police services, engage in a variety of 
productive security activities. Such “co-production” ranges from individual/household 
activities undertaken with police co-operation (property marking, becoming a special 
constable) to those lacking such co-operation (buying a fierce guard dog, surrounding one’s 
property in razor wire); and from group activities supported by the police (liaison groups, 
neighbourhood watch groups) to those denied such support (hiring a private security patrol to 
protect a group of residences, engaging in citizen patrol) (Johnston, 2001: 965). 
 
But though the paradigm captures the diversity of policing, the complex relationships 
are more than a matter of authorising and providing. 
 
The issue of relationships is addressed by those who speak of plural networked 
policing (Loader, 2000; Newburn, 2001; Kempa, Carrier, Wood and Shearing, 1999). 
This paradigm emphasises the relationship and co-operation between the diverse 
policing groups. In other words, it is not just that the boundaries between state and 
non-state institutions have “blurred”, but that they have been transformed by new 
partnerships. Though policing groups are diverse, Loader argues that they are not to 
be seen as isolated autonomous groups, but as together providing a security network 
across society. He talks of the “network of power” which:  
 
Continues to encompass the direct provision and supervision of policing by institutions of 
national and local government. But it now also extends to private policing forms secured 
through government; to transitional police arrangements taking place above government; to 
markets in policing and security services unfolding beyond government; and to policing 
activities engaged in by citizens below government (Loader, 2000: 323-4).  
 
This is a framework that recognises a multiplicity of state, market and community 
groups loosely networked to provide shared control, order and authority.  
 
Though many nodes are acknowledged, this paradigm assumes the primacy of state 
law and still regards the state government as the primary node. Certainly 
neighbourhood watch schemes incorporate individuals as, in effect, private agents in a 
networked policing process led by the state police. The security network, from this 
perspective, tends to be defined in terms of the variable relationships with the state. 
Yet the prominence of the state does not fit Africa policing patterns well, since the 
state police are largely absent in the rural areas and poorer neighbourhoods of the 
towns. Further, the “junior partner” theory of the relationship of private policing to 
public policing is very often a convenient myth. Private policing does not simply 
tackle lesser offences. It may often prefer to tackle the most serious offences itself and 
leave the state police to lesser offences. Nor do the state police always determine what 
private policing does. On the contrary, they are often found following private policing 
in terms of its techniques (Shearing and Stenning, 1983).  
 
The security governance paradigm of Johnston and Shearing (2003) takes on board all 
the insights of the earlier paradigms, but is prepared to deny any conceptual priority to 
the state in any security network. They are rightly wary of making assumptions about 
policing that are not born out empirically. For them it is important to carefully 
separate what policing is in essence, from the historical forms which policing has 
taken. That the traditional historical pattern has been one where policing is conceived 
as being about the application of punishment by state officers, is beyond dispute. 
However, as they point out, this is not the only way of approaching policing. Other 
mentalities to policing also exist, such as problem solving, risk management and 
remedial/restorative approaches operated through alternative institutions of the state, 
business or voluntary bodies. It is this historical baggage associated with “policing” 
that makes them prefer to speak of security and its governance. They define security 
governance as “the application of any means that will promote safe and secure places 
in which people live and work” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 71). The lack of 
specificity about the agents and the means they use is quite deliberate.  
 
This approach makes no “essentialist” assumptions about inter alia the functions of the police, 
the ends which they serve, the objectives which they pursue, the means by which they pursue 
them or the historical trajectory through which police institutions develop (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003: 60).  
 
The attraction of this paradigm is that it eschews preconceptions of policing and 
insists that only empirical research can establish the exact nature of security 
governance network in any given area and the relationships of the various nodes: the 
state sector, the business sector, the NGO sector and the informal sector (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003: 147). 
 
The only paradigm that specifically has Africa in mind is that proposed by Clapham 
(1999). It is one that, on empirical grounds, abandons the private/public division and 
makes the case for the universality of private policing. He contends that most African 
states have never developed “public” security systems in the first place, in the sense 
of security systems that protect all citizens without discrimination and that are 
accountable to them. Essentially the state security systems, in his view, have been 
developed to support the ruling elite in their hold on power and wealth. Clapham 
believes it is naive to imagine that, generally speaking, African states actually 
represent the populations of the territories ascribed to them. Their “public” security is 
little different from the “privatised” security systems controlled by groups and 
individuals. In the context of Africa, therefore, he sees no basis for retaining the 
dichotomy between “public” and “private” security. All security systems are private 
in that they all serve less than the whole population. What does divide these 
essentially private security systems is the degree to which they are efficient and 
accountable.    
 
Many of the claims that are made for the provision of public security through states are 
actually little more than special pleading, designed to appropriate a veneer of legitimacy for 
attempts by people who control states to use them for their own interests (Clapham, 1999: 
42).  
 
Failing to find true public policing in Africa, Clapham abandons the distinction 
between public (or state-managed) security systems and private (commercial or even 
criminal) ones. We are left, therefore, with a spectrum of private security systems. 
Each system displays a combination of the two basic criteria of any security system:  
“its efficiency in maintaining some kind of order on the one hand, and its 
accountability to those people whose security is at stake on the other” (Clapham, 
1999: 43).    
 
My own preference is to consider security from the point of view of the experience of 
the citizen rather than from a governance perspective. There is considerable value in 
undertaking participatory mapping as the tool to explore policing on the ground. 
Individuals and group are in a unique position to depict and analyse their own 
experience of policing. Starting from this perspective, the fluidity of policing becomes 
very apparent, for people are rarely users of either private or public policing, as if 
these were mutually exclusive categories. As people move about their daily business, 
or as the time of day changes, so they may move from the sphere of one security 
agency to which they would naturally look for protection, to another or be faced at 
times with a choice of agency to be made in terms of personal experience, preference 
for mentality (surveillance or punishment), cost or communal status. The extended 
family may protect the compound, but it is the street committee that sorts out the 
assault at the shebeen, a spontaneous mob that handles the bus station pickpocket, the 
commercial security guard that secures the entrance to the city centre office and the 
state police that are called if a colleague is murdered at the bank at lunchtime.  
Policing, as it is experienced, is not just diverse or private, it is a complex pattern of 
overlapping policing agencies. 
 
Much academic literature on policing constructs the choice as one between 
accountable public policing and minimally accountable private policing (though see  
Stenning, 2000). However, for Africans their experiences, or choices in as much as 
they have them, are based on “what is available”, “what works best” and “what can I 
afford”, more than issues of who controls the policing body and to whom are they 
accountable. Also within this paradigm familiar security terminology becomes 
problematic as popular understanding gives different shades of meaning or different 
applications. Thus “public” and “private” do not exist as straightforward terms in 
popular experience. Public policing not only fails to serve all equally, as Clapham 
pointed out, but neither is it free. To secure the interest, investigation and prosecution 
of a criminal case may well necessitate people offering bribes. Further, daily 
encounters with public policing at roadblocks and at roadside vending pitches is 
costly (on the violent street battles between hawkers and police officers in Nairobi in 
July 2002, see Daily Nation, 28 July 2002). Research in 2002 showed that on average 
each Kenyan had been forced to bribe the police 4.5 times a month, paying them on 
average US$16 per month. Over 95 per cent of dealings with the police had resulted 
in a bribe (Transparency International, 24 January 2002). And yet, “public” and 
“private” may well mean something in terms of the law and communal mores being 
enforced, despite the evident contradictions and confusions in their formal 
relationships.  
 
Though this paradigm recognises overlapping provisions, it downplays both the co-
operation and state police dominance of policing networks, since in Africa at least, 
there is often an element of competition between policing groups within the same 
geographic space or of parallel provision that offers choice based on performance and 
cost. There is a sense in which residents shop around for the type of policing they 
want (Scharf, 2001: 49). For instance, in an attempted rape case in a township in 
South Africa, a street committee (vigilante group), without consulting the victim, 
punished her assailant by ordering that he buy alcohol for the street committee 
members. The victim complained, not to the state police, but to an alternative 
informal justice body, a restorative justice committee, about the vigilantes’ conduct. 
After all sides had been brought together the members of the street committee 
apologised for their conduct (Roche, 2002: 521). In any situation there are often a 
surprising number of policing agencies - non-state and state, offering localised 
protection of different levels of legality, effectiveness, availability, methods and 
services. Each, of course, enforces their own code of conduct and standards. “In any 
given society”, as Pospisil puts it, “there will be as many legal systems as there are 
functioning social units (Pospisil, 1971: 24). These agencies create on the ground 
spheres of influence whose variety and changing nature is not dissimilar to a 
kaleidoscope of overlapping colours, or mathematical venn diagrams with 
overlapping sets. To what extent security provisions overlap in competitive or co-






What all the above paradigms recognise is that there is considerable diversity of 
policing authorisers and providers and that the relationship that they have to one 
another is complex and changing. Policing for many Africans is very informal and 
local. It is often the surveillance form of policing provided by the extended family 
(Anderson and Bennett, 1996). With large numbers engaged in care of children, 
working from home or simply unemployed, property is rarely left unattended and 
even then the eyes and ears of neighbours act as a second line of defence. Or policing 
may be of the responsive and punishment form, such as the mob, when alleged 
criminals are severely punished or killed by lynching, stabbing, beating, stoning or 
burning. This article, however, will concentrate on more organised forms and seeks to 
offer a provisional typology based on policing group’s role(s) (authoriser/provider), 
operational range, legality of actions, degree of co-operation with state police, 
commercial status (for profit/non-profit), and mentality (surveillance/punishment) 
(see Figure 1 below). 
 
Informal Organised Security Groups  
Informal organised security groups whose emphasis is on punishment security by the 
community are commonly known as vigilantes. These security groups not only act 
independently of the state police, but often do not co-operate with it and are prepared 
to break the law to achieve their goals of protection and investigation (or sometimes 
trials and sentencing) (Nina, 2001). As groups of private citizens organised on a 
voluntary, as needed, basis, they use or threaten the use of force in order to control 
crime or other social disorder. Whether or not vigilante acts are extra-legal and 
involve the infliction of punishment or simply censure, varies from group to group 
(Johnston, 2001: 968). 
 
Rising crime in African cities has seen innumerable initiatives by communities to 
tackle it, such that research in South Africa found that only half of black respondents 
“could say with certainty that no act of vigilantism had taken place in their 
community, with 20 per cent saying there had and 31 per cent being unsure” 
(Schonteich, 2000: 50). In a typical example from Grahamstown, Eastern Cape, an 
alleged rapist of a 15-year-old girl was summoned to a community committee to 
defend the charge and face the likelihood of a whipping. On twice failing to attend, 
the angry community members tore down his wattle and daub house (Eastern 
Province Herald, August 25, 2000). A little further south in Port Elizabeth, an 
organisation called Amadlozi serves, as they themselves put it, “the local community 
of law-abiding people”. Acting as a community service, it can draw 400 people of all 
ages and backgrounds three times a week to a community hall on the outskirts of the 
city to discuss policing problems and to conduct quasi-court sessions that hand out 
sentences of corporal punishment. Their “working groups”: 
 
Formally investigate the cases brought to their attention in the public sessions … They 
conduct raids that resemble ordinary police investigations or operations. At times they will 
gather a group of “residents”, arrange rallies [in their hundreds] outside the accused’s home 
and summon people or enter premises for investigative purposes (Buur, 2003b: 19).  
 
Their success rate in tracking criminals and getting them to speak so that stolen goods 
can be traced is so high that police crime statistics are said to show a reduction of 90 
per cent since the group began their operations.   
 
Among the cattle herders of East Africa informal security groups have a long 
tradition. Cattle raiding is dealt with by pursuit and recapture by posses, together with 
the summary killing of those deemed responsible. Since state policing in Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanzania has never been capable of preventing cattle raiding or of 
bringing the perpetrators to justice, the old violent retaliatory raids have continued 
(Heald, 1998; Abrahams, 1987). The organisation in Tanzania is simple but effective.   
 
Every man, young or old, had to be equipped with bow and arrows and with a gourd-stem 
whistle which was to be blown in emergencies. If a theft was committed, a hue and cry was 
raised and the thieves were to be followed by the young men of the village concerned. The 
whistles would alert the members of neighbouring villages who would in turn alert others in 
the same way (Abrahams, 1987: 181-2).   
   
Religious Police  
Religious police have much in common with informal organised security groups. 
They are community based, and use censure and beating to enforce their order with 
little regard for the state law and, despite their rhetoric, with minimal co-operation 
with the police. They differ in that they are organised typically by community 
religious or sometimes political leaders as part-time or full-time groups who exercise 
surveillance as well as responsive roles.  
 
Shari’a has regulated family and personal law since Nigeria's independence, but the 
newer versions are far more restrictive and wider in scope. For instance, since 1999, a 
dozen states in northern and central Nigeria have required “Islamic” dress, sexually 
segregated public transportation and the prohibition of alcohol. The reticence of the 
Nigeria police to enforce Shari’a Penal Codes led to the emergence of security groups 
called hisba (named after both the Qur’anic duty of all Muslims to “enjoin what is 
right and forbid what is wrong” and the office of hisba, or market inspector, who, in 
classical times would enforce honest trade). In Zamfara state the hisba:   
 
Attacked places where prostitutes were said to ply their trade and where alcohol was sold… 
Recognising that these hisba groups must be curbed if law and order were to be maintained 
and also aware of the slackness of the police in enforcing the Shari’a, some state governments 
(e.g. Kano), decided to establish their own, government-controlled hisba groups. The rules 
and regulations of the Kano hisba committee list mainly religious duties, such as counselling 
and guiding Muslims who are negligent in their religious duties or do not behave as a good 
Muslim should. They are not authorised to deal with crime, except in co-operation with the 
police. In order to make them recognisable to the public, they wear a uniform (Peters, 2001: 
28) 
 
From a communiqué issued by the Supreme Council for Shari’a in Nigeria, it is clear 
that it regards the provincial states as the legitimate authorisers of policing:  
 
The Hisbah group are an indispensable vehicle for the proper implementation of Sharia as its 
indomitable vanguard. … The Hisbah groups already established are meant to complement the 
police in their statutory duties and are not its rivals … But this can only be achieved if the 
mentality and orientation of the police force is refocused to one of service away from 
extortion and tyranny … we are fully aware of our fundamental constitutional rights in a free 
democratic society to pursue our activities as Muslims in the attainment of our rights as free 
citizens of this country. We therefore call on the federal government to stop trying to subvert 
the institution of Hisbah in its effort to sabotage the Sharia (Vanguard, July 2, 2001). 
 
In Ghana, predominantly Islamic suburbs of Accra have seen the emergence of 
“Sharia police” known as Isakaba. Members of hunting groups have constituted 
themselves into a volunteer group to enforce law and order under their leaders. Apart 
from authorising corporal punishment for those found guilty of “sins” such as 
premarital sex, they act as debt collectors, terrorising people into paying their debt 
instantly. The Isakaba also act, for a fee, as land guards (Accra Mail, Accra, July 19, 
2001). 
    
Ethnic/clan militias  
 
Ethnic or clan militias, like religious police, involve the formation of a part-time or 
full-time group that exercises both surveillance and punishment security with little 
regard for the state law or state police. Of course the order they are concerned to 
preserve is wider than religious affairs and concerns the whole cultural web that 
constitutes what makes the clan or ethnic group distinct. The clan/ethnic group basis 
also means that it has a wider geographical remit than the other informal groups so far 
mentioned.  
Though ethnic-based, they may be led not by traditional leaders but by local 
strongmen. Further, unlike the traditional chief’s courts, militias favour violence to 
negotiation and restoration. Thus, ethnically motivated mass killings have been a 
tragic feature of the 9-year conflict in DRC. The conflict has sucked in ethnic groups, 
spawning ever increasing numbers of ethnic and clan militias, as well as civilian 
vigilante groups. These paramilitary groups have killed on a mass scale 
(www.oxfamamerica.org/emergency/art5351).  
 
In Nigeria ethnic groups founded to protect and promote the interests of their peoples 
have been turned against crime. An example is the O'odua People's Congress (OPC), 
founded in 1994, which has used violence as a tool of both its ethnic militancy and its 
vigilantism, though this is often at the hands of undisciplined members. ODC has had 
powerful backers, including state government officials and even the explicit support 
of state governors. Hence OPC members have provided security at official and public 
functions. The federal government, on the other hand, has denounced its violence: 
 
In 1999, the federal government announced a ban on the OPC and gave the police orders to 
deal with the organization ruthlessly. Instructions to the police to “shoot on sight,” combined 
with the OPC's defiance of the ban, provoked a heavy-handed and brutal response from the 
police. The police regularly raided and broke up OPC meetings; scores of OPC members were 
killed by the police and hundreds arrested … Despite this crackdown, the OPC has continued 
to function, sometimes underground, but more often boldly and openly challenging the federal 
government's and the police's attempts to crush it (Human Rights Watch, 2003).  
 
Armed mobile groups operating under the leadership of factional or clan heads are 
also a feature of Somalia. In addition to enforcing social order within the area claimed 
by their lineage, they function as personal militias. Farah and Lewis, for instance, 
identified 40 militia manned checkpoints (divided between more than 10 lineage 
groups) along two trade routes commonly used by qat trucks (1993: 61).  
 
Political Party militia groups  
Operating in the interests of modern political parties rather than traditional tribes, but 
using similar methods to the ethnic militias, are the party militias. Yet whereas ethnic 
militias will tend to have a regional basis, party militias may have a national coverage. 
These groups are convenient bodies for national or local strongmen to enforce their 
will without the encumbrances of the law. Typically young unemployed men are 
recruited and their dependency on the patron instils a fierce loyalty and willingness to 
use extreme violence. President Mugabe in Zimbabwe has put them to effective use to 
prevent his political rivals from seizing power through elections. Hundreds of ZANU-
PF party militia members wearing T-shirts emblazoned with the words, “No to Mass 
Action” were used to harass the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
supporters’ demonstrations in July 2003
 
. The militia in this case, being that of the 
ruling party, works closely with the police, which means that no action is taken 
against members when they commit human rights abuses. 
President Banda of Malawi had set up a similar organisation in 1963 when he founded 
The Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). This elite wing of the League of Malawi Youth, 
a division of the Malawi Congress Party, was charged with mobilising the youth for 
national development. They were mainly concerned with rural development work and 
in promoting adulation to Dr Banda, his party and his government. Over time, 
however, the MYP added a security role. Trained in the use of small arms, and 
intelligence gathering, they began to be deployed as a “third security force”. They 
forced people to buy the party membership card and, as Banda’s private army, 
detained, tortured and sent into forced exile his opponents. Following an abortive 
invasion of the country in 1967, they were given additional military training and were 
equipped with automatic weapons and even helicopter gunships. Thus by the 1980s 
they overlapped or even overshadowed the Police and Army in their security 
operations. Their demise came in 1993 when the army, with enthusiastic support from 
the public, intervened. They attacked MYP establishments, disarmed them and 
dismantled the organisation. At the time there were an estimated 6,000 armed Young 
Pioneers, plus a reserve force of about 45,000 previously trained Young Pioneers 
(Phiri, 2000). 
 
The tradition of party militias is still prevalent in Cameroon. Most political parties in 
Cameroon have long trained militants as security men. The “vanguards” of the Social 
Democratic Front, according to the coordinator, are those who protect the party. They 
are seen as supplementing the police during large political events, particularly in 
maintaining order during rallies. They are not armed, but wear uniforms. Acting for 
the National Union for Democracy and Progress are the uniformed “party police”. 
The 200 members, ranging from lower grades to the rank of “General”, guard party 
premises and officials. They are trained by retired policemen and those guarding top 
officials of the party are armed. For its part the People’s Union of Cameroon has a 
non-uniformed security unit whose role is said to be to ensure peace within the party 
and to discretely to spy on their “enemies”, whether traitors within the party or other 
political parties (Cameroon Tribune, Yaoundé, September 4, 2003). 
 
Civil defence forces  
CDFs typically emerge during a general breakdown of civil authority and law in a 
civil war, when neither a depleted state army nor an ineffective police can offer state 
protection to citizens. They arise as substitutes for conventional defence forces and 
thus have a military as well as anti-crime role. Though they share the armed group 
structure of ethnic and political party militias, they function in a different context and 
are concerned to provide general security for all within their region of operation. For 
example, the CDFs in Sierra Leone – the Kamajors, Tamaboro and Kapras, were 
formed to protect citizens from the brutality of war propagated by the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) and the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Having 
their roots in traditional hunters and warriors, they were largely structured around the 
ethnic identity of their community. When the civil war began in 1991, they mobilised 
communal forces to support the national army in defeating the RUF. By 1998, these 
militia groups had virtually supplanted the remaining elements of the army, and 
became the key to pushing back the RUF and AFRC, which had led a coup in 1997. 
The CDFs were themselves, however, guilty of looting, rape and attacks on civilians, 
plus atrocities against those suspected of supporting the RUF/AFRC. Like the rebels 
they fought, they participated in mineral extraction and fought for control of the 
informal and clandestine trading networks around the mining regions (Ero, 2000). 
When peace finally came they were reluctant to disband, hoping that President 
Kabbah, whose regime they had defended, would reward them handsomely. In the 
case of the Kamajor, they continued in the role of something like a private security 
force for their leader (and then Minister of Defence), Hinga Norman. It remains to be 
seen if they will survive following his arrest on war crimes. 
 
There has also been a resurgence of hunter associations (donzo ton) in an anti-crime 
role in Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s. Their success in reducing crime in northern 
rural areas has led to an expansion of the associations at the national level, as private 
security guards in the country's major cities. The government and political parties also 
employed hunters (donzow) to complement the police and gendarmes in maintaining 
order during the 1995 presidential elections. Yet fearing that they might become a 
politically destabilising force, successive governments have attempted to restrict their 
activities to the northern savannah region (Bassett, 2003). 
 
The long-running civil war in Angola saw similar developments in community self-
protection. In rural Huambo, internally displaced persons and villagers established 
civil defence groups to handle potential security threats:  
 
Civil defence groups, composed of both men and women, have been organised both by the 
local population and the authorities. Men carry the weapons, women patrol the paths and 
roads. Some members of the civil defence teams carry light weapons to protect settlements 
and markets. On the roads into towns, members of the civil defence regularly check that 
people are not carrying weapons and bombs hidden in their bags and baskets. Sometimes, a 
small civil defence group is left to protect houses and crops in villages from which most of the 
population has already fled (Birkeland and Gomes, 2001). 
     
 
Informal Commercial Security Groups   
Informal organised security groups typically involve action by private citizens on a 
voluntary basis. Occasionally, however, under the patronage of local political agents 
or economic agents, they grow into large commercial operations with full-time 
operatives. The political agents may see them as the solution to local crime waves that 
threaten their legitimacy and popularity. In such a situation these security groups may 
assume a public or community role, rather than (or as well as) one intended for the 
benefit of a limited group. Three State Governors in the South East of Nigeria have 
employed an informal security group known as the Bakassi Boys to be, in effect, 
regional police forces under their command (Baker, 2002c; Human Rights 
Watch/CLEEN, 2002). Their methods included extra judicial killings (typically 
decapitating suspects and setting them on fire) and the torture of detainees. One 
witness described the death of a robber in Adambra: “Two of the [Bakassi] boys first 
cut off his two hands, gave him a few cuts on his legs, at his back and finally slashed 
off his head using sharp knives. Blood gushed out and the crowd roared in applause” 
(Newswatch, September 18, 2000). In Imo State, villages without any police presence 
had initially set up local vigilance units with the co-operation of the police to combat 
armed bandits. Discovering that information given to the police about suspected 
bandits was passed on to the gangs, they turned to the Bakassi Boys. Recorded one 
villager:  
 
Suddenly things began to happen. Well known hoodlums who were friends of the police 
gradually took notice and either fled or stayed at their peril. In a short time, locking and 
bolting gates and doors in my village became only a matter of habit - nobody needed to. 
Asked thereafter to choose between the Bakassi Boys and the police, the village folks 
preferred the former  (www.waado.org/NigerDelta/Documents). 
 
Elsewhere it is business interests that have funded commercial informal security 
groups. The largest such group in South Africa is “Mapogo a matamaga”, formed in 
1996 in the Northern Province to protect rural businesses (Baker, 2002b; Oomen, 
1999). Annual subscription to the group is R50-165 (though farms and big businesses 
can be charged up to R10,000. The group has become infamous for its sjambokking 
(whipping) and brutal assaults of alleged criminals. Initially concerned with 
protecting rural communities, it now also patrols the suburbs of Johannesburg and 
Pretoria. Its leaders claim 10,000 members in Gauteng and 40,000 in Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga. Its president says: “the main thing that attracts members…is that we 
know how to deal with criminals. We believe in corporal punishment and that really 
works”  (Africa Research Bulletin, January, 2000). They say their investigations are 
effective because they work with the community members. Upon “arresting” an 
alleged criminal, members mete out their own brand of “medicine” to “cure them of 
their bad ways”, before handing them over to the police (Africa Research Bulletin, 
January, 2000; Mail & Guardian, January 28, 2000).  
 
In the southern Niger city of Zinder it was taxi and lorry owners who in 1991 called 
on two vigilante leaders from a neighbouring city to establish a group to protect their 
businesses. Clothed in new uniforms they were presented to the local prefect and the 
mayor of Zinder.  
 
The mayor provided torch lights for night patrol and the police commissioner was pressurised 
into furnishing the leader of the m’banga with a pair of handcuffs. Henceforth the m’banga 
was known as the police traditionele du Sultan as well as the security service of the 
businessmen of the town (Lund, 2001: 860).  
 
Armed with sabres and spiked mace they would beat suspected thieves and parade 
them dressed in women’s clothes dancing like a monkey. If the family refused to pay 
a certain compensation for their release they would be handed over to the police. 
After the 1996 coup, when the police started obstructing the group’s collection of 
money from businesses, they expanded into the realm of providing personal security 
guarding for politicians. 
 
Formal Commercial Security Groups 
So far groups that feel no constraint to keep the law, that have no specific policing 
training and that rarely co-operate with the state police have been considered. Formal 
commercial security, however, essentially operates within the law and in co-operation 
with the police, using trained full-time guards. Though their emphasis is on 
surveillance, they do use punishment security as well, usually in the form of exclusion 
and/or handing people over to the state police. Another contrast to the majority of the 
groups so far considered is their operational range. Though some are local, operating 
in a single town, many commercial security groups operating in Africa are now part 
of global companies headquartered in the West, for example, Group4Falk and 
ArmorGroup. 
 
The origins of commercial policing in Africa are largely to be found in the mining 
industry and the desire of mine owners and their managers to exercise total control 
over their compound migrant workforce (Van Onselen, 1976; Philip, 1989). In South 
Africa, state police were increasingly preoccupied with security problems in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and the expansion of this commercial security was actively encouraged by 
the Government to relieve pressure on the overstretched South African Police (Philip, 
1989; Irish, 1999; Brogden and Shearing, 1993). In this context it is not surprising 
that formal commercial policing took off in South Africa before any other African 
country. By 2000 the number of active security officers registered with South Africa’s 
Security Officers’ Interim Board was 166,000. Uniformed and equipped to a similar 
or better standard than the state police, it rapidly assumed much of the day-to-day 
policing of white suburbs of South Africa’s towns (Baker, 2002a). From guarding 
buildings, commercial policing grew to include patrolling, armed response and 
electronic systems and now undertakes all the roles of the state police. 
 
The 1990s saw the commercial security sector expand rapidly across all parts of 
Africa, but especially where the state is weakest, with governments, commercial 
corporations, aid agencies and private citizens using it for their protection. The most 
common services provided are risk analysis, security
 
 training for staff, the transport 
and protection of resources and emergency aid (e.g. by CARE and World Food 
Programme), protecting elites from crime, and site protection (e.g. ICRC and other aid 
agencies in Kinshasa) (Vaux, 2003). 
The commercial security industry is divided on whether their guards should be armed, 
some arguing the merits of the system used in Cote d'Ivoire, where a few trained 
individuals in some companies are armed with weapons which are stored at a nearby 
police station and returned on close of duty with an account for the rounds given 
them. Others call for widespread arming in the light of the frequent use by criminals 
of weapons (Irish, 1999: 30). 
 
State Approved Civil Guarding  
Also working within the law and with the approval and co-operation of the state 
police, but not for profit, are a range of security groups authorised by citizen groups 
and sub-national political units and provided by small groups of trained guards. 
Johnston tries to capture something of their ethos by calling them responsible citizen 
responses (1992). They are particularly prevalent in South Africa, partly because of its 
large middle class. There, security units are found based on city residents groups, who 
operate vehicle patrols with the co-operation of the South African Police Service and 
private security firms. Elsewhere city residents have formed non-profit companies and 
hire police reservists for armed foot patrols. Others are based on city businesses such 
as a block in a city centre, which are protected and patrolled by security guards or by 
car guards (Shaw 1995: 77; Baker, 2002a). Still others are based on farms, which co-
operate to engage security firms to patrol their land (Africa Research Bulletin, 
September, 1998). For all that these are private initiatives, they share the 
acknowledgement of the state as performing a valuable service for community order 
and safety. 
 
An example of a sub-national political unit that has authorised and provided its own 
policing with state approval is the Douala city council in Cameroon. They set up in 
2002 their own traffic police in the face of insufficient state policing in the 
commercial centre of the city. The uniformed Douala IV Urban Council police are 
divided into 4 teams of 10 persons. They are posted along the congested main roads 
with whistles to control vehicles, prevent illegal parking and to intervene when an 
accident occurs. According to the Chief of the municipal police, they are not a 
challenge to the gendarmerie or police, but work with them “to reduce the traffic 
anarchy”. When drivers ignore traffic regulations, sanctions are meted out, ranging 
from verbal warning to large fines and the seizure of documents (Cameroon Tribune, 
Yaoundé, June 26, 2003). Similarly, Accra Municipal Authority maintains a small 
enforcement unit, the City Guards, “whose role is largely ambiguous and limited to 




The chiefs’ courts, for all their recent demise, are still probably the predominant 
administrators of justice in rural Africa. They form a hierarchy of legal structures 
designed to provide responsive policing that for the most part is non-violent. Though 
they operate on the basis of customary law, they typically work within national 
constitutions and therefore with state police approval. The courts have a conciliatory 
character in that they aim to restore peace between members and social order 
following such matters as petty theft, fights, out of wedlock pregnancies, adultery and 
civil disputes (Zwane, 1994; Stack, 1997; Kwame, 1985; Bekker, 1989; Carlston, 
1968; Schapera, 1957; Seymour, 1970). Arrests can be made by tribal police, but 
more often litigants press the case themselves. Litigants generally make every effort 
to resolve the matter informally. A person with a claim against another proceeds to 
the kraal of the defendant, accompanied by a party of advisers, witnesses and 
supporters where the appointed spokesmen will state the case to the defendant. There 
and then, or at a later time after consulting advisers, the defendant will respond. 
Where the dispute cannot be resolved the two will go to the headman of their own 
village. The procedure has a semi-judicial character and the dispute is examined 
thoroughly. If the plaintiff does not obtain satisfaction it can be taken to the chief's 
court, where the chief acts as the judge. The chief’s court is a public affair in that 
everyone (i.e., all adult men of the tribe) can freely participate. The men present have 
the right to cross-question the parties and to express an opinion as to what the 
decision or verdict should be. When the chief formally pronounces the verdict of the 
court, he is merely reflecting the consensus of opinion expressed by the tribal 
members present. Punishment may include compensation to the other party in the 
dispute, a small fine to the chief, and the guilty party may have to pay the full costs of 
the case. The party who wins the case may also be asked to give the chief a portion of 
the compensation he receives as a token of his gratitude to the chief for giving him a 
fair hearing. Some sentences include corporal punishment.  
 
Though this restorative policing usually works within the law, their legitimacy 
transcends modern legal forms. Thus the elders in Somaliland, filling the vacuum left 
by the collapse of the central state and faced with rising banditry, have decreed that 
responsibility for paying damages for the actions of armed groups should be directly 
shouldered by the families of persistent offenders, rather than, as before, extend to the 
whole group. If an armed robber is unable to pay compensation, the burden falls upon 
his father and brothers. Though in some cases offenders are executed, the policing 
primarily relies on moral authority rather than physical coercion (Farah and Lewis, 
1993). The power of such systems to prevent the occurrence of crime and violence 
remains limited, but in the words of the Somali elders, they can at least offer “fire 
extinguishing”.  
 
Restorative Justice Committees 
Also enjoying state approval are the restorative justice committees or “community 
courts” that seek to restore and maintain social order. Though they mark a new 
approach, they reflect traditional justice values of the traditional courts, particularly 
their emphasis on restoring relationships. They can be the product of NGOs with state 
backing or spontaneous phenomena in the community. The former has been the case 
in townships in South Africa. For instance, peace committees have been formed in 
some 10 townships under an NGO programme known as the Community Peace 
Programme (CPP) funded by the South African Government and international donors 
(Roche, 2002; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). The main work of committee members, 
for which they are paid a very small remuneration, is to provide local and accessible 
peacemaking facilitation to resolve specific conflicts. In the informality of committee 
members’ homes, they bring together the victim and offender, with their respective 
supporters, to attempt to negotiate on a consensual basis the resolution of the 
injustice. Typically they deal with disputes over debt repayment and shack 
inheritance, but they also cover a range from strictly non-illegal matters such as noise 
complaints, infidelity and insulting language, to serious crimes of domestic violence 
and rape. Negotiated settlements might include a promise to return stolen goods, to 
help repair material damage, to repay money owed, or to desist from offending 
behaviour. Most of the gatherings are held within five days of the offence. They 
provide an alternative to formal conviction and sentencing in the criminal justice 
system, although there is always the overshadowing threat that if the issue is not 
resolved it may well be taken to the state courts. The peace committees, in contrast to 
other informal justice systems in the townships, pledge to work within the South 
African law, to abstain from violence and to follow procedures that are open for the 





It is surprising that so little is known about policing in Africa when it is such a key 
measure of democratisation and good governance. Yet research on the structure of 
policing in Africa, particularly outside of South Africa, has been fragmentary and 
uneven. A survey of published research (Bayley and Shearing, 2001) revealed a 
dearth of data and analysis concerning the nature of contemporary policing in Africa, 
the effect of fragmentation on justice, accountability and quality of service, and the 
actions of governments to control and hold accountable all forms of policing. The 
only book published on the continent’s contemporary policing remains Alice Hills’ 
Policing in Africa (Hills, 2000).  
 
Nevertheless the general trends in policing in Africa are clear. It is not a monopoly of 
government, but is increasingly diversified away from the state to non-state formal 
and informal agencies. The current situation is one where there is both a separation of 
those who authorise policing from those who provide it and also a widespread 
exercise of both functions by non-government actors. In addition, there is a tendency, 
particularly for informal groups, to transform over time. 
 
Non-state policing is engrained in every community of Africa with the specific form 
of non-state protection adopted being determined by availability, cost and preference 
for their methods. It is ubiquitous to the point that few challenge its legitimacy, even 
if they criticise some of its practices. Such is the current low priority given by state 
police on the protection of property that few, including the state police themselves, 
would deny that non-state policing of whatever hue is seen as the best available 
deterrent and the fastest responder in time of emergency. There are few in Africa who 
would insist that the state be given a monopoly of all policing functions and that non-
state policing should be proscribed. Though private and commercial initiatives can 
never ensure that there is equal provision and access, the state policing services are 
too deficient in available resources, training and institutionalised accountability for 
them to simply absorb non-state police roles. The priority for governments is not just 
to improve the strength of numbers of the state police. They must be brought under 
full democratic control, corruption must be curtailed and lawless behaviour 
eradicated. This can only be a slow process and thus, in the foreseeable future, non-
state policing will continue to be an integral part of African life. If non-state policing 
is inevitable and indispensable, then many see the immediate task as at least bringing 
the “responsible” elements under statutory legislation, so that it is more fully 
accountable to the public and fit to be a partner in the security network. Yet even this 
limited programme is likely to be hampered by a lack of resources to implement 
recommendations. As regards those policing groups that feel no compunction about 
breaking the law, they may be outlawed, but little is likely to be done to bring them to 
an end.   
 
Though the reliance on non-state policing might be inevitable, it creates a number of 
serious problems for new democracies. The widespread use and support for non-state 
policing undermines the legitimacy of the state police, with the danger that a view of 
the state police as irrelevant will extend to seeing the state itself as irrelevant. Citizens 
might well ask, what is the point of political engagement with a state that fails to offer 
such a basic service as personal security and when non-state initiatives are available? 
Another cause for concern that has been raised is the degree to which the scale of non-
state policing exacerbates inequality. The nature of non-state policing means that it 
can offer no equality of accessibility and adjudication. Access to non-state policing 
services is uneven, depending on location and/or wealth. For community self-help 
groups it depends on local initiative and by no means all people are offered any 
provision at all. Likewise, at the commercial end of policing provision, it is clear that 
it is related to class. The right to freedom and security is not universally available. 
Then again, in cases where non-state policing undertakes adjudication, there are 
inevitably serious concerns about standards of investigation, scrutiny of evidence, the 
sanctions available and the consistency of treatment for citizens. Certainly some 
policing groups are guilty of denying people their legal and constitutional rights, hasty 
verdicts, presumption of guilt and of violent and inhumane practices. The latter is part 
of a culture of violence that many policing groups maintain. Yet, of course, it only 
promotes counterforce. As citizens arm themselves, or call on armed non-state 
policing for protection and revenge against criminal violence, the likelihood is that 
criminals will undertake their activity prepared to meet defensive violence with 
violence.  All these concerns about non-state policing are genuine, yet the truth is that 
they also apply to the current forms of state policing to varying degrees. 
 
Though the overall pattern of policing in Africa is clear, what are far less clear are the 
details on a country by country basis. Exactly who is constructing and delivering 
policing? Who are the people responsible for authorising policing? How many non-
state providers of policing, both voluntary and commercial, are there, what do they 
do, and whom do they serve? Are the nature and scope of state policing changing? 
How do state and non-state policing agents interact? Do they ignore, hinder, or help 
one another? Do different providers of policing take different operational approaches 
when performing the same task? To what extent is policing in all its forms under 
ultimate civilian and parliamentary control? Is policing conducted so as to ensure 
accountability, equality of access to and enforcement of justice, and uniform quality 
of service? These are not just academic questions, but real concerns for new 
democracies. This article has begun the construction of a typology to understand the 







The author is currently investigating this in Mozambique and Uganda in an ESRC 
funded research programme (Award Reference: R000271293). 
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Together, the perceptions of failing state police and rising crime have created a situation today where a 
plethora of non-state policing groups have emerged across the continent. Their variety is bewildering. 
Some adhere to the law and have police support, some are lawless and violent in their assault on crime; 
some are spontaneous, short lived or evolving, some are more permanent commercial enterprises. They 
are authorised by an array of groups besides governments. These include economic interests (legal and 
illegal), residential communities, cultural communities, and individuals. Similarly, there is considerable 
variety amongst those who provide policing. Commercial companies, non-state authorisers of policing, 
individuals, as well as governments are involved.  It is this variety and complexity that the proposed 
paper would explore. It would begin with an examination of the paradigms that have been proposed to 
capture this fragmentation of policing, before introducing a typology of the various categories of 
policing groups that have arisen and their key features. The paper would conclude with an assessment 
of the dangers of proliferating non-state policing.  
 
 
 
